THE EVOLUTION OF REGIONAL ACTORS' PEACE-BUILDING CAPACITY: The European Union and its twin track approach to peace-building in Macedonia

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Abstract

This paper examines regional actors' capacities for crisis management and peace-building operations, focusing specifically on the European Union (EU) and its role in Macedonia. It focuses on the EU's approach to stabilizing the Balkans, and argues that its involvement in Macedonia is an evolved form of the overall EU policy in the Balkans because it consists of a twin track peace-building approach, where so-called *hard* power measures (such as peacekeeping troops), and *soft* power measures (such as regional integration and the process of EU enlargement) combine to provide an overall carrots-and-sticks approach to peace-building. The paper further compares this approach with that of the US post-World War II involvement in Western Europe, drawing parallels and lessons for regional actors engaging in future conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives.

Key Words: peace-building, EU, Macedonia, twin track, regional actors, regional integration, enlargement

Introduction

This paper examines the evolution of regional actors' capacities for crisis management and peace-building operations, focusing on the European Union (EU) as an active player in the process of stabilizing the Balkans. The paper examines the Union's particular involvement in Macedonia and argues that this form of engagement represents a more evolved approach of the overall EU policy in the Balkans – namely, a twin track model of peace-building, where so-called *hard* power measures (military and/or security measures such as peacekeeping troops), and *soft* power measures (such as regional integration and the EU accession process) combine to provide a carrots-and-sticks approach to long-term peace-building. This approach not only demonstrates the EU's commitment to the region, but it also exhibits a striking parallel with the manner in which the United States had approached the problem of Western Europe's post- World War II reconstruction and stabilization process. The paper concludes with the hypothesis that such an approach, as taken by the EU in Macedonia, while initially an *ad hoc* attempt to manage the complexity of a post-conflict environment, might be turning into an applicable model of long-term peace-building, one that would address the security dilemma in a post-conflict society,[1] as well as provide the economic development and reconstruction required to sustain a peace process and assure peace consolidation.

The structure of the paper is as follows. It briefly examines the evolving role of regional organizations in conflict management activities, particularly after the end of the Cold War and in response to the shifting nature of conflicts in the 1990s. In that context, it focuses on the Balkans in the 1990s and specifically the development of peace-building initiatives in Macedonia and the increased involvement of various actors. The paper then goes on to discuss the role of the European Union in Macedonia and illustrates how the EU is improving its understanding of, and approach to peace-building, by augmenting so-called 'hard power' measures aimed at tackling the security dilemma in the country with

[1] See Barbara F. Walter, 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement', *International Organization*, 51: 3 (Summer 1997): 335-363

a parallel process of supporting political reform through the EU accession process. The paper concludes with a comparative examination between this evolving twin-track model for the EU and post-World War II US initiatives in Western Europe, and suggests that the EU's continued engagement in Macedonia and the Balkans points to the development of a more comprehensive, consistent and coherent model for managing post-conflict situations by a regional organization.

The growing regionalization of security: regional organizations and conflict

The United Nations has the primary responsibility to ensure the prevention of international conflict according to the UN Charter. Nevertheless, the Charter allows for the creation and involvement of regional organizations in preventing conflict and promoting stability in their respective regions (Chapter VIII on Regional Arrangements).

The end of the Cold War witnessed the proliferation of ethnic conflicts, and the rise of new security threats, such as global terrorism and international trafficking, making it necessary for regional organizations to play a greater role in maintaining peace and stability in their regions. With the increasing global economic integration, there is also a 'world-wide trend towards regionalism'.[2] In contrast to the Cold War era, when regional organizations were subordinated to the larger East-West conflict, the post-Cold War easing of antagonism allowed these organizations to assume a larger role.

The focus on regionalism has increased in importance due to the regionalization of international security, achieved in part by the shift in the interests of major powers.[3] Causes of instability are now more contingent on country and regional dynamics, and changing interests often mean a decrease in desire to resolve conflicts seen as not vital to strategic goals.[4] Countries must look to arrangements which have the greatest interests in stability in that region and the greatest understanding of the causes and dynamics of the conflict. The nature of security challenges also reinforces the trend towards increased regional involvement.[5] Moreover, intrastate conflicts bring into question the relationship between conflict prevention and state sovereignty, especially in cases of failed states, civil wars etc. A regional organization may be more effective in addressing such problems.

These developments underlie the increasing focus on the roles that regional organizations can play in conflict prevention and peace-building. Given the multidimensional aspect of most conflicts today and the level of global economic integration, the UN must act in a coordinated manner with regional and local actors to provide the necessary, and often complex, solutions for ending conflicts. Regional organizations are uniquely placed to affect conflict prevention for a variety of reasons: their greater familiarity and strategic interests in the region, their flexibility due to smaller memberships (compared to the UN),

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[2] Alan K. Henrikson, 'The Growth of Regional Organizations and the Role of the United Nations', in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 163

[3] Andrew Hurrell and Louise Fawcett, 'Conclusion: Regionalism and International Order?', in Fawcett and Hurrell, *Regionalism*, 1995: p. 311

[4] Ibid.

[5] Hurrell and Fawcett would argue that today's challenges arise not so much from strength and military power but weakness: weak states, weak governmental institutions, weak economies etc. (Ibid., p. 312)

their economic or political links with parties to the conflict, as well as their role in promoting cooperation and development in their respective regions.[6] They can also serve as conduits between international and local actors, support local processes and more importantly, provide financial and military resources to implement effective peacekeeping missions. This was recognized by the UN in the early 1990s when Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar stated that 'for dealing with new kinds of security challenges, regional arrangements … can render assistance of great value'.[7]

From a UN perspective, regional arrangements are useful for conflict prevention regardless of whether they deem themselves to be regional arrangements under the auspices of Chapter VIII, and whether their objectives purposely aim at conflict prevention.[8] This kind of open-ended view means that even the European Union, a regional entity, could be considered a regional organization for the purposes of conflict prevention.[9]

While it is thought that regional organizations would be more effective actors due to more flexible frameworks, Gary Wilson argues that for the most part the intergovernmental nature of such arrangements suggests that the capabilities they wield depend very much on the agreement and willingness of its actors to use them.[10] The operational problems that arise in UN-led multi-actor conflict prevention and peace-building operations are just as likely to occur under a NATO-led mission. In Europe, it is NATO that has played a significant role in conducting military enforcement operations in the context of peace agreement negotiations.[11] However, this does not mean that NATO is eager to intervene in every dispute on European soil, and indeed the EU has increasingly begun to develop its security and military agenda. Some would argue that EU members are recognizing the need to develop a regional capability to take collective action in response to a crisis,[12] or at the very least, to contribute to peace-building processes in what is considered the EU's own backyard.

Modern peacekeeping is essentially a multidimensional task carried out by many actors, and military alliances such as NATO are ill-suited to handle the civilian tasks of the

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[6] 'Sharing Best Practices on Conflict Prevention: The UN, Regional and Subregional Organizations, National and Local Actors', *IPA Workshop Report*, 2002, p. 3

[7] Quoted in Henrikson, *Regionalism*, 1995: p. 123

[8] In fact, he gives the example of NATO which proclaims to be a collective self-defense alliance and not a regional organization (Gary Wilson, 'UN Authorized Enforcement: Regional Organizations versus Coalitions of the Willing', *International Peacekeeping*, 10: 2 (Summer 2003), p. 96

[9] Such a view could allow a regional entity to claim the right to intervene in local conflicts despite the dubiousness of its organizational character. In the case of the European Union, the debate regarding its nature and character is still on-going. However, due to the intergovernmental framework under which its foreign and defence policies are placed (pillar 2 of the Maastricht Treaty), in this paper I will treat the European Union as a regional unitary actor, akin to a regional organization, regarding matters which fall under the above-mentioned policies.

[10] See *supra* 8.

[11] An example are the air strikes in Bosnia in the 1990s, followed by its active role through IFOR and SFOR and its air strikes against Yugoslavia in 1999 (Ibid., p. 97)

[12] Ibid., p. 98

operation.[13] Regional organizations can facilitate such tasks, namely prevent conflict through community building, developing dialogue and facilitating regional economic integration and through such measures 'promoting the formation of shared stakes in peace and stability'.[14] International actors are facing continuous challenges of coordinating their approaches to implementing peace agreements and sustaining a peace-building process.[15] The importance of continuity in maintaining a consistent strategy between different phases of the conflict is paramount for the success of the peace-building process. With the explosion of actors involved in different phases of a conflict, coordination between them will become an even bigger problem.[16] One solution would be allowing a single actor, with adequate capacities, to take charge of the situation. Keeping the above in mind, one can argue that to ensure success of the peace-building process in Macedonia, and stability in the Balkans overall, the EU is well placed, and should take the lead, as it is closely engaged with the region, can avoid coordination problems typical in large, multi-national coalitions, and given recent developments in Macedonia, it is able to tackle both the 'hard' and 'soft' aspects of peace-building.

Regional actors in Macedonia: from the UN to NATO to the EU

Many analysts argue that Macedonia is essential to the European security structure.[17] Due to its history and its position, stability in Macedonia means stability for the Balkans and it is believed that a conflict in Macedonia would engulf neighbouring countries.[18] There is a commonly acknowledged opinion that the UN peace operation deployed in Macedonia in the early 1990s was the first preventive diplomacy operation in the history of the United Nations.[19]

In December 1992, the UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission was sent to Macedonia and deployed along its borders with Serbia and Albania, with the purpose of deterring external threats.[20] Security Council Resolution 983(1995) of 31 March 1995, replaced UNPROFOR by three separate but interlinked peacekeeping operations, one of which was UNPREDEP in Macedonia.[21] The United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) became an independent mission in 1996. It ended on February 28, 1999 as a result of a Chinese veto in the UN Security Council in response to Macedonia's

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[13] Walter Dorn, 'Regional Peacekeeping is Not the Way', *Peacekeeping & International Relations*, 27: 3-4 (July-October 1998), p. 3

[14] *IPA Workshop Report*, p. 5

[15] Bruce D. Jones, 'The Challenges of Strategic Communication', in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens, (eds.), *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, Lynne Reiner, 2002, p. 89

[16] Ibid., p. 102

[17] P.H. Liotta and Cindy R. Jebb, 'Cry, the Imagined Country: Legitimacy and the Fate of Macedonia', *European Security*, 11:1 (Spring 2002), p. 50

[18] Ibid.

[19] Biljana Vankovska-Cvetkovska, 'UNPREDEP in Macedonia: New Approach to the Concept of Modern Diplomacy?', *Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*, 2:1 (March 1998), available at http://www.trinstitute.org/ ojpcr/2_1vankov.htm

[20] Richard J. Crampton, *The Balkans since the Second World War*, (London: Pearson, 2002), p. 133

[21] Ibid.

establishment of diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[22] The operation was welcomed both by Macedonian authorities and the wider international community as a very encouraging and prospective precedent.[23] It also served as an early warning mechanism and performed this function well as it was able to call attention to the unstable internal situation as well.[24] Consequently, the Security Council extended the repertoire of prevention techniques and the mission focused on three main pillars of its mandate: political action and good offices (political dimension), troop deployment (military dimension), and the socio-economic component.[25] The mission was recognized as a significant instrument for facilitating dialogue between different segments of society. Some analysts began to pose the question 'whether the operation had turned into [a] … peace-building/development role, rather than a defensive hedge against spillover effects from neighboring states'.[26]

Growing recognition followed the end of the UN mission that some international presence in Macedonia was required to off-set the potential spillover from the conflict in Kosovo. The European Parliament (EP) recognized the mission's contribution to the peace and stability of the country and urged greater international involvement in order to prevent spillover of the Kosovo conflict.[27] It is interesting to note that the EP argued for the European Union to take over the mandate of UNPREDEP, in cooperation with NATO, WEU and the OSCE, if the UN was unable to act.[28] NATO took over the mission immediately and the force simply changed insignia and continued with the same mandate.[29]

The failure of NATO forces to seal Kosovo's borders allowed the KLA to move fighters into Macedonia and foment discontent between the country's two major ethnic groups, the Macedonians and the Albanians. In March 2001, the National Liberation Army (NLA) clashed with the Macedonian army in a border town in north-west Macedonia, sparking an extended crisis with over 60,000 refugees fleeing the area. This prompted frantic diplomacy by the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Representative, Javier Solana, accompanied by Lord George Robertson, NATO's Secretary-General at the time. The speed and unity with which the EU acted, even signing a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Macedonia during this period, led many observers to argue that the EU has finally come of age as a regional

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[22] Miroslav Baros, 'Macedonian Conflict and International Law: Self-determination or Self-Defence', *International Peacekeeping*, 10:3 (Autumn 2003), p. 62

[23] At the time, Macedonia was in a very delicate political, economic, social and security situation. It lacked an effective army and defense system, and was unable to create one due to the arms embargo against all the former republics of Yugoslavia. The regional situation was very unstable due to the war and became even more so with the internal collapse of Albania in 1997. The international community did not recognize Macedonia but the presence of UN troops was perceived as a *de facto* recognition of its existence (See Vankovska-Cvetkovska, 1998).

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] See Shashi Tharoor, 'The Concept of Preventive Deployment in the 1990's', paper presented at the Workshop on An Agenda for Preventive Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, Skopje, October 16, 1996, p. 12

[27] European Parliament, 'Resolution on the failure to extend the mandate of UNPREDEP', B4-0235, 0256, 0271, 0284 and 0297/99, available at http://www.radicalparty.org/humanrights/mac_re7.htm

[28] Ibid.

[29] Baros, 'Macedonian Conflict', 2003: 62

power.[30] The intense diplomacy culminated in the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement by the key political parties in Macedonia in August 2001. The agreement was designed to introduce changes to the constitutional framework that would improve the status of ethnic Albanians in the country. NATO launched *Operation Essential Harvest* in August 2001 to assist in demilitarizing the NLA, as part of the peace consolidation process.[31] Some 3500 NATO troops were deployed; to be replaced later by a 350 strong European Force (EUFOR) which took over from NATO on 31 March 2003 in what became *Operation Concordia* - the first EU-led military mission.

In light of these developments, the lessons for peace-building measures in Macedonia are several. The Operation and the coordinated response by the different representatives of EU and NATO represent an insightful example of the complex role of regional actors in peace-building processes. In addition, the deployment of the EU force signaled its commitment to maintaining peace in Macedonia, illustrating a unified EU foreign policy response to events in the country.[32] The EU has moved away from an *ad hoc* and often inconsistent approach that characterized the early days of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, to a more sustained engagement on all levels with the country and the wider region. The EU has recognized the implications of instability in the region, not only for the Balkans but also for its own integration project, and in light of American views on the future direction and engagement of NATO, it is eager to finally assume responsibility for its own backyard.

The EU's evolving role in Macedonia: a twin track approach to peace-building
The military/hard power track

September 11 accelerated the trend of US withdrawal from peacekeeping activities in Europe and specifically the Balkans, leading to increased talk of transferring NATO's peace and security responsibilities in the region to the EU.[33] As NATO moves on to 'bigger things' in terms of its security role, the EU is likely to increase *its* role and its responsibility for stability on the European continent.
In 1991, the European countries had embarked on a process designed to provide a European military capability. NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers decided that the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) should be built within NATO. In 1998, the St. Malo meeting led to an agreement that the European Union 'must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to

[30] See John Peterson, 'US and EU in the Balkans: 'America fights the wars, Europe does the dishes?'', *EUI Working Papers*, RSC No. 2001/49, European University Institute. For more information on the conflict, see Baros, 'Macedonian conflict', 2003; pp. 60-78. For a brief outline of the causes of the conflict and the role of the EU in mediating the peace agreement, see Justin L.C. Eldridge, 'Playing at Peace: Western Politics, Diplomacy and the Stabilization of Macedonia' *European Security*, 11:3 (Autumn 2002), pp. 46-90
[31] Baros, 2003: 71
[32] Since its independence, it was Macedonia's position in the Balkans and in particular its rocky relationship with Greece that provided the framework for EU policies towards the country. The political difficulty with the name and the Greek Presidency of the EU at the time of Macedonia's independence put a strain on intra-EU relations causing incoherent and contradictory policies vis-à-vis the country (See Dimitrios Kavakas, *Greece and Spain in European Foreign Policy*, [Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001]).
[33] Ibid. p. 107

decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises'.[34] During the following years significant developments took place, most notably, the EU governments' decision that responsibility for the future development of ESDI and corresponding structures would be assumed by the EU itself.

The EU has taken the lead in the Balkans although it has opened itself up to cooperation with other players, namely Russia, in crisis management and conflict prevention in Europe.[35] According to the research group *Stratfor*, 'the only spot in the continent that requires forces is the Balkans … and this is child's play compared to the tasks of NATO's past'.[36] This would explain much of the reasoning behind NATO's willingness to concede authority over peace-building operations to the EU, as was the case in Macedonia and Bosnia. The problem with this view is that it tends to underestimate the effects of a failed peace-building operation, both in terms of the regional impact and the impact on the EU's security and consolidation process. However, the EU's willingness to engage in a sustained and comprehensive manner shows that it is very aware of these potential impacts, having borne much of the fallout of the Yugoslav wars in terms of refugees, trafficking of drugs and people, etc. It has contributed to a growing involvement by the EU in Macedonia and further in the Balkans, and the development of an increasingly viable EU military force, with simultaneous disengagement of NATO partly due to the extension of its role in out-of-area conflicts.

The EUFOR Commander had argued that *Operation Concordia* was a milestone in the EU's ESDP, stating that the force 'under EU order, will hold up international stability in a region which has become a sort of critical test for the future [ESDP]. Success … could mean a larger EU military engagement in the Balkan[s].'[37] *Operation Concordia* continued NATO's work in providing support for international monitors and a visible presence on the ground. Its primary objective was to contribute to stabilizing the situation in Macedonia as a basic prerequisite for the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement signed in 2001.[38] The EU's goal was to establish a secure environment in Macedonia. It aimed at addressing the security dilemma,[39] especially in the former crisis area and in the aftermath of the NATO-led disarmament of the rebels. The mandate of the operation was initially granted until 30 September 2003; nevertheless it was later extended until December 2003. The military mission then made way for *Proxima*, the EU police mission. *Proxima* was deployed in Macedonia from December 2003, with the broader purpose of reinforcing the rule of law. With some 180 units, the objective of *Proxima*

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[34] NATO Handbook Official Website at http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0403.htm

[35] The EU has worked out modalities for Russian forces' participation in EU crisis management operations, where Russia will be fully informed and consulted if it is a troop-contributor. An example of this new form of cooperation was the EU police mission in Bosnia, launched in January 2003, where Russia contributed several officers. This was the first EU crisis management operation, and the first one to include Russian troops working in the Balkans under EU command (Lynch, 'Russia's Strategic Partnership with Europe', 2004, p. 109)

[36] Ibid.

[37] EUROFOR Official Website at http://www.eurofor.it/Mission_CONCORDIA_03%20INDEX.htm

[38] The European Commission delegation to the FYROM Official Website at http://www.delmkd.cec.eu.int/en/ concordia/main.htm

[39] See Barbara F. Walter, 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement', *International Organization*, 51: 3 (Summer 1997): 335-363

was to support the development of a professional and effective police force and promote European policing standards. These developments attest to the increasing utilization of the EU's hard power (albeit still dependent on NATO for certain resources) to minimize the security dilemma in Macedonia. The mission rested on the same premises as UNPREDEP, namely that the presence of the international community (or in this case the EU) was a clear signal of their commitment to the stability of the country.

The civilian/soft power track

The European Union's establishment of cooperation networks in the Balkans has had the avowed objective of transforming potential conflicts and fostering long-term peace-building and consolidation.[40] The European Union has arguably represented a 'symbol of structural peace and reconciliation among ancient enemies'.[41] The EU sees itself as a model for regional integration, which has underpinned its involvement in regional issues, as well as its conflict management policies and participation in the peace processes in the Balkans.[42]

There is a close relationship between regional integration agreements and security in the sense that they act as alliances of sort against external or domestic threats.[43] Security threats among neighbouring countries can further stimulate the creation of regional integration schemes as the creation of the ECSC illustrates, where the underlying rationale was that it would reduce the threat of war.[44] Closer regional integration, especially in the area of trade, can reduce security tensions among neighbours and promote stability.

During the 1990s, a number of initiatives, supported by the European Union, were introduced in the Balkans to stimulate regional cooperation.[45] Most of these, particularly the Stability Pact, provide the prospect of EU membership for the Balkan states. They came as an attempt to 'Europeanize' the Balkans to the point where 'war becomes unthinkable.'[46] The Stability Pact has made clear that regional cooperation is a precondition for integration into the EU-Atlantic structures. Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen stressed this at the time: 'if countries want to join the European Union then they must prove that they can develop regional cooperation and resolve their problems in

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[40] Reinhardt Rummel, 'The European Union's Politico-Diplomatic Contribution to the Prevention of Ethno-national conflict', in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (eds.), *Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996), p. 212

[41] Ginsberg, cited in Lily Gardner Feldman, 'Reconciliation and legitimacy: Foreign Relations and the Enlargement of the EU', in Thomas Banchoff and Mitchell P. Smith (eds.), *Legitimacy and the EU, the contested Polity*, (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 78

[42] Ibid., p. 79

[43] Maurice Schiff and L. Alan Winters, 'Regional Integration as Diplomacy', *Policy Research Working Paper 1801*, (Washington: The World Bank Development Research Group, August 1997), p. 2-3

[44] This was also noted by Jean Monnet in his statement on European integration (Cited in Schiff and Winters, 'Regional Integration as Diplomacy', p. 1).

[45] Some of these initiatives are the South East Europe Cooperation Initiative, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (compared by some authors to the Marshall Plan), the South Eastern Europe Cooperation Process etc (See Andrew J. Pierre, 'De-Balkanizing the Balkans - Security and Stability in Southeastern Europe', *USIP Special Report*, United States Institute of Peace, 20 September 1999 available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr990920.html)

[46] See Srdjan Vucetic, 'The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe as a Security Community-Building Institution', *Southeast European Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (October 2001), pg. 109-134

cooperation with their neighbours'.[47] Regional cooperation is thus seen as a catalyst for peace-building and stabilization. The proliferation of such arrangements have helped increase security in Europe by promoting confidence among states, reinforcing mutual dependence, reducing economic differences, and promoting development and further integration.[48]

Political stability in Macedonia and the Balkans cannot be achieved without an adequate level of economic security and growth. Intensifying trade and other economic links among Balkan countries can contribute to economic recovery, while faster development is crucial for the region's political and economic stability. Improved regional integration leads to economic development and increased trade and investment flows.[49] The *inclusivist* school of thinking argues that development underlies the philosophy of peace-building, and the two are mutually reinforcing.[50] Jelena Smoljan points out that post-conflict reintegration, as a critical aspect of a peace-building process requires economic assistance and development in order to succeed.[51] In fact, the synthesis of peace-building and development is a better method of creating peace in societies that had undergone internal conflict.[52] EU trade policy towards the Balkans is therefore of vital importance, because expanded trade with the Union is crucial for economic recovery.[53] The EU has set up instruments and a policy framework for fostering closer economic and trade links with the Balkans. Until 2000, these countries were beneficiaries of the pre-accession financial instrument PHARE; however in 2001, the EU introduced the CARDS programme (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stability in the Balkans) which fell within the scope of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP).[54] As of 2007, CARDS and PHARE were replaced by the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), which aims to channel EU assistance to candidate and potential candidate countries in the Balkans through a single unified instrument.

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[47] Franz Lothar-Altmann, 'Schemes of regional cooperation in South East Europe', *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 3:1 (January 2003), p. 142

[48] Anders Bjurner, 'Reflections on Subregionalism and Wider European Security', in Renata Dwan (ed), *Building Security in Europe's New Borderlands*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 11-12

[49] I. Sers, 'Regional integration for economic development and growth', *Regional Integration and Transition Economies: The Case of the Baltic Rim*, (France: OECD proceedings, 1996), p. 181

[50] Jelena Smoljan, 'The relationship between peace-building and development', *Conflict, Security & Development*, 3:2 (August 2003), p. 234

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid., p. 248

[53] Daskalov and Mladenov propose a radical plan which comprises asymmetric liberalization of EU trade policies towards the Western Balkans, removal of trade barriers with the EU, followed by gradual inclusion of the Western Balkans into CEFTA as a means of liberalizing intra-regional trade (See Stanislav Daskalov and Nickolay E. Mladenov, with Daniel Gros, Paul Brenton, Michael Emerson and Nicholas Whyte, 'A Comprehensive Trade Policy Plan for the Western Balkans: A Bold Initiative to Bring More Stability and Prosperity to South Eastern Europe', *CEPS Working Document* 146, part 2, (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2000), available at http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=23)

[54] The SAP is a process modeled on the Europe Agreements with Central Europe, whose goal is to improve trade links and cooperation between the Balkans and the EU and to prepare the Balkan countries for accession to the Union.

The EU argued that accession is determined by appropriate behaviour, provided the Western Balkan countries 'establish normal relationships between themselves.'[55] Leeda Demetropoulou has shown how aspirations for EU membership can bear significant EU-oriented transformations and adaptations in the Balkan countries domestic political scenes.[56] She examined the accession effect on Macedonia, and argued that despite past limited EU support and lack of candidate country for accession status until 2005, the country has still proceeded towards a certain policy and institutional levels of adjustment in compatibility with EU norms.

The EU was also paramount in forcing Macedonia's leadership to come to an agreement with the NLA to end the conflict. Their 'strong arm-twisting' was coupled with a Stabilization and Association Agreement that promised a $30 million aid package for Macedonia and made it a 'potential candidate' for EU membership.[57] This agreement and the EU's continued support for Macedonia's integration into the Union were made contingent on the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement and the continued dialogue between the two ethnic groups.

Long term economic support, an extended military presence, regional economic integration and the creation of regional security structures can contribute to stability of both Macedonia and the Balkans.[58] Liotta and Jebb call this Europeanization:

> The Balkans need the leverage that can be achieved only by satisfying the region's single common aspiration: Europeanization…extending the cross-border monetary [and] trade arrangements that already operate within the EU…This New Deal should apply to all states in the region…[59]

An analysis of the different measures and policy instruments which the EU has created to manage the consolidation of stability (both political and economic) in the Balkans, evokes familiarity to historians focusing on US involvement in Western Europe after World War II. A Marshall Plan coupled with an integration process into a stable security community would address many of the problems in the region. The US approach to Western Europe rested on similar considerations, and some historians have argued that 'the Marshall Plan was designed predominantly for political objectives, albeit its mechanisms were almost entirely economic'.[60] The organization created to coordinate the Plan was the precursor of what later became the European Coal and Steel Community. Historians have further argued that American aid served to integrate Western Europe economically and politically as an area of liberal democracies. Instead of a complex peace settlement after the end of the war, an institutionalized pattern of economic interdependence was developed as the basis for European economic and political

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[55] Eric Herring, 'International security and democratization in Eastern Europe', in Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring and George Sanford (eds.), *Building Democracy? The International Dimension of Democratization in Eastern Europe*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 204

[56] See Leeda Demetropoulou, 'Europe and the Balkans: Membership Aspiration, EU Involvement and Europeanization Capacity in South Eastern Europe', *Southeast European Politics*, 3: 2-3 (November 2002), pp. 87-106 (my emphasis)

[57] Eldridge, 2002: p. 62

[58] Ibid, p. 64

[59] Isaiah Berlin, cited in P.H. Liotta and Cindy R. Jebb, 2002: p. 74

[60] Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51*, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1984), p. 5

existence and stability.[61] European integration would serve to increase productivity, help the reconstruction of society and provide stability both domestically and regionally. While initially the US questioned the desirability of an integrated Europe, which could be a competitor in the global economy, the onset of the Cold War modified its thinking.[62] The Marshall Plan stipulated security integration as well, and new integrative institution-building that would ensure security was prompted with the eruption of the Korean War and the rise in tensions between the East and the West.[63] The traditional enmities within the region were also drastically reduced under the American security umbrella.[64] As Anthony Eden declared, 'it was the military threat to the West… which brought NATO into being.'[65]

The EU's engagement in the Balkans has been based on a similar approach. It is a case of the students becoming the teachers, and it is regularly pointed out by the EU that its own integration process and subsequent rise as a powerful entity are 'one of the greatest success stories of peace-building in history.'[66] What had been an evolving response to an economically shattered Europe and a rapidly shifting international political scene after the war, became a model for consolidating the Balkans after the conflicts of the 1990s. In fact, the European Commission openly states that,

> The European Union (EU) has a special interest and responsibility towards the stabilization and development of the southeastern European region. The EU strategy for the five countries … is based, on the one hand, on the model used to rebuild Western Europe after the Second World War, and on the other hand on policies adopted by the then European Community towards the countries of central and eastern Europe following the collapse of communism there in 1989.[67]

This model echoes the American approach in terms of security. The security threats in the region, while not on a global scale nor expressed in terms of bipolarity as during the Cold War, are nevertheless destabilizing factors for these nascent democracies. The trafficking of people, drugs and weapons, organized crime, refugee flows etc., can cause instability in Western Europe and along its borders – increasingly so as the enlargement process continues to include wider areas of Europe. Many of the Balkan regional cooperation initiatives can be seen in this light.[68] Srdjan Vucetic has argued that the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe created a nascent security community in the region and is thus an example of the success of regional integration in terms of providing stability. However,

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[61] Ibid., p.463

[62] Peter van Ham, *The EC, Eastern Europe and European Unity*, (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1993), p. 21

[63] Ibid., p. 31

[64] Benjamin Miller, 'The Sources of Regional War and Peace: Integrating the Effects of Nationalism, Liberalism and the International System', pg. 57-59, available at www.yale.edu/irspeakers/Miller.doc

[65] The Cold War environment also determined which actors could join the European integration project (Ibid.)

[66] The EU's relations with South Eastern Europe (Western Balkans) – Regional Approach, European Commission Official Website at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/region/europe_integration.pdf

[67] Ibid.

[68] Srdjan Vucetic, 'The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe as a Security Community-Building Institution', *Southeast European Politics*, 2: 2 (October 2001), pp. 109-134

since the Pact was constructed by an outside party - the EU - rather than through local initiatives, it will require a sustained engagement by that party to ensure regional security. The EU governments have recognized this and urged greater regional ownership of the process. The Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) was therefore created, which is set to succeed the Stability Pact and further anchor the Balkan countries' commitment to an effective and sustainable regional integration and cooperation process.
What these developments in the Balkans have shown is a consistent and systemically oriented application of a successful framework for long-term peace-building, which has improved through continued learning and adaptation to local needs and challenges. At its foundation, this framework aims at political and economic progress, coupled with security and stability guarantees. The inclusion of Macedonia into the integration process - both regional and EU - and the reduction of the security dilemma through the presence of EU military troops and police support units, are one example of a micro-level application of a twin track peace-building model which incorporates both traditional and contemporary understandings of human security.

Conclusion

Promoting the concept of 'peacekeeping with teeth', without attendant social and economic development strategies, may result in severely undersupplied peace operations aimed at influencing the political incentives of parties to a conflict.[69] However, an actor that is able to act both as a 'peacekeeper with teeth' and a 'peacekeeper with a carrot' would be more effective in maintaining a holistic peace operation with greater chances of long-term success. The present EU policy instruments for the Balkans have been built around the goal of post-conflict peace-building and stabilization and the UN recognizes the valuable role that the EU played in resolving the conflict in Macedonia in 2001.[70]

Some authors argue it would be difficult to see the EU taking on large scale operations without the US, although certain peacekeeping and crisis management operations would be feasible.[71] Much depends on the different perceptions within the EU of what ESDI's goals are and this disagreement affects the EU's role and capability to act.[72] There has been skepticism that EU governments would be able to agree on a common policy on EU-led operations, due to the diverse interests and mistrust among the states.[73] However, the engagement in Macedonia shows that the EU can have a united policy and when it does, it can also utilize its growing military capabilities to address 'hard security'

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[69] Joseph Lepgold, 'NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem', in Paul F. Diehl (ed.), *The Politics of Global Governance - International Organizations in an Interdependent World*, 2nd ed., (Boulder: Lynne Riener Publishers, 2001), p. 229

[70] United Nations Resolution 1345 (2001), S/RES/1345 (2001), 21 March 200, available at http://www.hri.ca/ fortherecord2001/ documentation/security/s-res-1345.htm

[71] Gale A. Mattox and Daniel Whiteneck, 'The ESDI, NATO and the new European security environment', in James Sperling (ed.), *Two Tiers or Two Speeds? The European security order and the enlargement of the European Union and NATO*, (New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), p.131

[72] The French for example would like ESDI to be used for EU operations of a defence nature whereas the more Atlanticists of the EU member states would like to keep it as a sort of 'working group' under the umbrella of NATO (Ibid. p. 124)

[73] Emil Kirchner, 'Second pillar and eastern enlargement: the prospects for a European Security and Defence Identity', in Sperling (ed.), 1999: p.59

issues.[74] The EU has further learned how to use the powerful symbolism of European unity as a diplomatic tool, supported by its economic power.[75] In this manner, the EU is evolving its ability to act as a regional peace-builder not only using its wallet but also its stick. The growing disengagement of NATO from the region leaves greater room for the EU to finally be responsible for the security and stability of the Balkans. Given the enlargement process and the future accession of Turkey, which would bring the EU's borders into the Middle East, such an approach will prove quite useful.

A twin-track peace-building framework of economic incentives and integration, as well as peacekeeping troops and police support, is a more effective model for sustaining a long term peace-building process. It approaches conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building in a more streamlined manner, recognizing the need to address both hard and soft security issues. Having a single actor is also more cost effective as it minimizes the potential for disagreement and inconsistency, and it reduces the possibility of external manipulation. While Claire Piana argues that using the 'soft power' instrument of enlargement only applies to the Balkans, and is the only example of a *true* EU foreign policy,[76] the EU's military operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), paired with its humanitarian aid, shows that the twin track approach can also be used outside of the European arena.

The EU's development as a full regional actor, united in its objectives and its means is a significant development from the intergovernmental entity that was faced with the Yugoslav crisis and an inability to maintain policy coherence. It was the series of crisis in the Balkans in the 1990s that persuaded the EU of the need to supplement its soft power with military attributes, especially given that its economic 'carrot' failed to stop the conflict in Yugoslavia.[77] Military capacity proved to be critical for stabilizing and resolving the conflicts in both Kosovo and Macedonia, and such a capacity would also make the EU less dependent and more autonomous from the US.

Therefore, the EU is aiming to make itself a 'one-stop shop' for security.[78] This would further augment its international presence and the EU's international identity as a civilian actor will increasingly shift. There have also been indications that the EU may consider any action taken under ESDP not necessarily requiring UN approval.[79] While the involvement of the EU in Macedonia and the wider region can be viewed as a useful framework for other regional organizations engaged in peace-building initiatives (for, example the African Union), it is also an indication of how far the European Union has

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[74] John Peterson, 'US and EU in the Balkans: 'America fights the wars, Europe does the dishes?'', *EUI Working Papers*, RSC No. 2001/49, European University Institute, p.12
[75] Ibid.
[76] Claire Piana, 'The EU's Decision-Making Process in the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 7 (2002), p. 216 (emphasis in the original)
[77] Adrian Treacher, 'From Civilian Power to Military Actor: The EU's Resistable Transformation', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 9 (2004), p. 55-56
[78] Ibid., p. 65
[79] Lynch, 'Russia's Strategic Partnership with Europe', 2004, p.111

come in developing a policy coherent approach to its engagement in the Balkans after the initial responses in the 1990s.

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